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Asymptotically Secure Network Code for Active
Attacks and its Application to Network Quantum
Key Distribution
Masahito Hayashi Fellow, IEEE and Ning Cai Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—When there exists a malicious attacker in the net-
work, we need to be careful of eavesdropping and contamination.
This problem is crucial for network communication when the
network is realized by a partially trusted relay of quantum key
distribution. We discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network
with the secrecy and robustness conditions when the above type
of attacker exists. Also, under the same setting, we discuss the
asymptotic rate in a linear network when we impose the secrecy
condition alone. Then, we apply these results to the network
composed of a partially trusted relay of quantum key distribution,
which enables us to realize secure long-distance communication
via short-distance quantum key distribution.
Index Terms—secure network coding, sequential injection,
active attack, universal code, asymptotic rate
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure information transmission over a network is an impor-
tant topic because there is a risk that a part of the network is
broken, contaminated, and/or eavesdropped in a large network
system. Cai and Yeung [1] started the study of secure network
coding, which offers a method securely transmitting informa-
tion from the authorized sender to the authorized receiver. The
demand for such a type of secure communication is increasing
beyond the areas of information theory and communication
theory. For example, to realize rigorous security, quantum key
distribution is actively studied [2]. Its commercial use has been
well developed for limited transmission distance [3]. However,
it is very difficult to directly connect two distinct parties over
long distances via quantum key distribution. To realize long-
distance communication with quantum key distribution over
short distances, they often consider using quantum repeater
[4], [5], [6]. However, it is also difficult to realize quantum
repeater. Hence, it is natural to establish a network whose
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edges are realized by secure communication by one-time-pad
use of keys generated by quantum key distribution over short
distances. That is, we generate many pairs of shared secure
keys on intermediate nodes by quantum key distribution, where
each pair is composed of two nodes connected by an edge.
The secure keys shared by two nodes realize a secure channel
between the two nodes. Hence, the application of the network
coding to the network composed of these secure channels
yields a scheme to realize secure communication between two
distinct parties across a long distance. However, there is a
possibility that a part of the nodes are occupied by Eve. Hence,
we need to use secure network coding instead of network
coding. To resolve this problem, the pioneering papers [7],
[8] studied this type of information transmission for the case
of partially trusted routing networks. This paper addresses a
general network including routing networks, in which a part
of the nodes are attacked and the attacked nodes cannot be
identified by the sender and the receiver like the Byzantine
setting. The network topology is not known to the sender and
the receiver.
In the above type of network, there are two types of
attacks. In the first type of attack, the malicious adversary,
Eve, wiretaps a subset EE of all the channels in a network,
which was studied by the first paper by Cai and Yeung [1].
Using the universal hashing lemma [9], [10], [11], the papers
[12], [13] showed the existence of a secrecy code that works
universally for any type of eavesdropper when the cardinality
of EE is bounded. In particular, the paper [14], [15], [16]
discussed a concrete construction of such a universally secure
code, which is more practical. As another type of attack on
information transmission via a network, a malicious adversary
contaminates the communication by changing the information
on a subset EA of all the channels in the network. Using an
error correction, the papers [17], [18], [19], [20] proposed a
method to protect the message from contamination. That is,
we require that the authorized receiver correctly recovers the
message, which is called robustness. Now, for simplicity, we
consider the unicast setting. When the transmission rate from
the authorized sender, Alice, to the authorized receiver, Bob,
is m0 and the rate of noise injected by Eve is m1, using the
results published in [21], [22], the study [23] showed that there
exists a sequence of asymptotically correctable codes with the
rate m0−m1 if the rate of information leakage to Eve is less
than m0 −m1.
However, there is a possibility that the malicious adversary
combines eavesdropping and contamination. That is, con-
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taminating a part of the channels, the malicious adversary
might improve the ability of eavesdropping while a parallel
network offers no such a possibility [24], [25], [26]. In fact, in
arbitrarily varying channel model, noise injection is allowed
after Eve’s eavesdropping, but Eve does not eavesdrop the
channel after Eve’s noise injection [27], [28], [29], [31][30,
Table I]. The studies [14], [15], [16], [34] discussed the
secrecy when Eve eavesdrops the information transmitted on
the channels in EE after noises are injected in EA, but they
assume that Eve does not know the information of the injected
noise.
In contrast, this paper discusses the secrecy when Eve adds
artificial information to the information transmitted on the
channels in EA, eavesdrops the information transmitted on the
channels in EE , and estimates the original message from the
eavesdropped information and the information of the injected
noises. We call this type of attack an active attack and call
an attack without contamination a passive attack. Specially,
we call each of Eve’s active operations a strategy. Indeed,
while the paper [32] discusses robustness for an active attack,
it discusses secrecy only for a passive attack. When EA = EE
and any active attack is available for Eve, she is allowed
to arbitrarily modify the information on the channels in EA
sequentially based on the obtained information. Fortunately,
the previous paper [33] showed that an active attack has the
same performance as the passive attack in the case of linear
codes.
The aim of this paper is as follows. First, we give a formu-
lation of our setting with a general set EE of eavesdropping
nodes and a general set EA of noise-injection nodes. Then,
we state that no strategy can improve Eve’s information when
every operation in the network is linear, which is a brief review
of the result of [33]. Next, we discuss a code that satisfies the
need for secrecy and robustness when the transmission rate
from Alice to Bob is m0, the rate of noise injected by Eve is
m1, and the rate of information leakage to Eve is m2. In the
asymptotic setting, given linear operations on the intermediate
nodes with a certain order, our protocol controls only the
encoder in the sender and the decoder in the receiver. Since we
address the static Byzantine setting, the sender and the receiver
do not know the two sets EE and EA, i.e., what edges are
attacked, while they know the channel parameter m0 and the
upper bounds of m1 and m2. Although intermediate nodes
make linear operation over a single transmission, the sender
and the decoder are allowed to make coding operations across
several transmissions. Such a coding is called a non-local code
to distinguish operations over a single transmission. We show
the existence of such a secure protocol with rate m0−m1−m2.
Since our non-local code depends only on the number m0,
the upper bounds of m1 and m2, and the dimensions of the
input and the output, it works universally. Also, we discuss
the asymptotic performance when only secrecy is considered.
When Alice and Bob share a small number of initial secret
keys and can communicate with each other via a public
channel, we do not need to impose robustness, but need the
correctness only for passive attack because we can make error
verification [35, Section VIII]. In such a case, we show the
existence of a secure protocol with the rate m0 −m2.
Then, we apply these two types of asymptotic analyses to
network quantum key distribution. Since public communica-
tion is allowed in quantum key distribution, the latter setting is
more useful for the security analysis in network quantum key
distribution. Further, although the above discussion addresses
the unicast setting, we explain how to extend this setting to the
multiple multicast case including the multiple unicast case.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II formulates our problem and shows the impossibility
of Eve’s eavesdropping under a linear network, which is
a brief review of the result by [33]. Section III discusses
the asymptotic setting, and show the achievability of the
asymptotic rate m0 − m1 − m2. Section IV discusses the
asymptotic setting with secrecy without robustness. Using the
result of Section IV, Section V considers the application of
obtained results to network quantum key distribution Section
VI applies the obtained result to multiple multicast networks.
In Section VII, we state the conclusion.
II. SECRECY IN FINITE-LENGTH SETTING
Although the paper [33] discusses the formulation of a chan-
nel model of network with eavesdropping and contamination
more rigorously, this section briefly explains this model in
the case of an acyclic network with well synchronization. We
consider the unicast setting. Assume that the authorized sender,
Alice, and the authorized receiver, Bob, are linked via an
acyclic network with the set of edges E, where the operations
on all nodes are linear on the finite field Fq with prime power
q. Alice inputs the input variable X1 in Fm3q and Bob receives
the output variable YB in Fm4q . We also assume that the
malicious adversary, Eve, wiretaps the informationYE in Fm6q
on the edges of a subset EE ⊂ E. Now, we fix the topology
and dynamics (operations on the intermediate nodes) of the
network. When we assume all operations on the intermediate
nodes are linear, there exist matrices KB ∈ Fm4×m3q and
KE ∈ Fm6×m3q such that the variablesX,YB , andYE satisfy
their relations
YB = KBX, YE = KEX. (1)
That is, the matrices KB and KE are decided from the network
topology and dynamics. We call this attack the passive attack.
To address the active attack, we consider stronger Eve, i.e.,
we assume that Eve adds an error Z in Fm1q on the edges
of a subset EA ⊂ E. Using matrices HB ∈ Fm4×m1q and
HE ∈ Fm6×m1q , we rewrite the above relations as
YB = KBX+HBZ, YE = KEX+HEZ, (2)
which is called the wiretap and addition model. We set the
parameter m0 as
rankKB = m0, (3)
and assume the ranks of HB and KE as
rankHB = m1, rankKE = m2. (4)
Hence, the channel parameters are summarized as Table I.
1In this paper, we denote the vector on Fq by a bold letter. But, we use a
non-bold letter to describe a scalar and a matrix.
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TABLE I
CHANNEL PARAMETERS
m0
Rank of the channel from Alice
to Bob, i.e., rankKB
m1 Rank of Eve’s injected information Z (rankHB)
m2 Rank of Eve’s wiretapped information YE (rankKE )
m3 Dimension of Alice’s input information X
m4 Dimension of Bob’s observed information YB
m5 Dimension of Eve’s injected information Z
m6 Dimension of Eve’s wiretapped information YE
Now, to consider the time ordering among the edges in
E, we assign the integers to the edges in E such that E =
{e(1), . . . , e(k)}. We assume that the information transmission
on each edge is done with this order. In this representation, the
elements of Z and YE are arranged in this order. Hence, the
elements of the subsets EE and EA are expressed as EE =
{e(ζ(1)), . . . , e(ζ(m2))} and EA = {e(η(1)), . . . , e(η(m1))}
by using two strictly increasing functions ζ and η. The
causality yields that
HE;j,i = 0 when η(i) ≥ ζ(j). (5)
It is natural that Eve can choose the information to be added
in the edge e(i) ∈ EA based on the information obtained
previously on the edges in the subset {e(ζ(j)) ∈ EE |ζ(j) ≤
η(i)}. That is, the added error Z is given as a function α
of YE , which can be regarded as Eve’s strategy. We call this
attack the active attack with the strategy α.
Now, we consider the n-transmission setting, in which,
Alice uses the same network n times to send the message
to Bob. Alice’s input variable (Eve’s added variable) is given
as a matrix Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Fm3×nq (a matrix Zn =
(Z1, . . . ,Zn) ∈ Fm1×nq ), and Bob’s (Eve’s) received variable
is given as a matrix Y nB ∈ Fm4×nq (a matrix Y nE ∈ Fm2×nq ). We
assume that the topology and dynamics of the network and the
edge attacked by Eve are not changed during n transmissions.
In particular, the operations on intermediate nodes are not
changed. Then, their relation is given as
Y nB = KBX
n +HBZ
n, (6)
Y nE = KEX
n +HEZ
n. (7)
Notice that the relations (6) and (7) with HE = 0 (only the
relation (6)) were treated as the starting point of the paper [32]
(the papers [21], [22], [23]).
To discuss the secrecy and the robustness, we formulate a
code. LetM and L be the message set and the set of values of
the scramble random number. Then, an encoder is given as a
function φn from M×L to Fm3×nq , and the decoder is given
as ψn from Fm4×nq to M. Our code is the pair (φn, ψn), and
is denoted by Φn. Since the code pair of φn and ψn is across
n transmission, it is called a non-local code to distinguish
operations over a single transmission. Then, we denote the
message and the scramble random number by M and L. The
cardinality of M is called the size of the code and is denoted
by |Φn|.
Here, we treat KB ,KE , HB , HE as deterministic values,
and denote the pairs (KB ,KE) and (HB , HE) by K and
H , respectively. In the following, we fix Φn,K,H, α. As
a measure of the leaked information, we adopt the mutual
information I(M ;Y nE , Z
n) between M and Eve’s information
Y nE and Z
n Since the variable Zn is given as a function of
Y nE , we have I(M ;Y
n
E , Z
n) = I(M ;Y nE ). Since the leaked
information is given as a function of Φn,K,H, α in this
situation, we denote it by I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α]. When we
always choose Zn = 0, the attack is the same as the passive
attack. This strategy is denoted by 0. and chooses her strategy
dependently of the position.
Now, we have the following theorem [33].
Theorem 1. For any Eve’s strategy α, Eve’s information Y nE
with strategy α and that with strategy 0 can be simulated by
each other. Hence, we have the equation
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, 0] = I(M ;Y
n
E )[Φn,K,H, α]. (8)
While the paper [33] showed this theorem in a more general
setting with more rigorous description of the problem setting,
we briefly give its proof in Appendix A. This theorem shows
that the information leakage of the active attack with the
strategy α is the same as the information leakage of the passive
attack. Hence, to guarantee the secrecy under an arbitrary
active attack, it is sufficient to show the secrecy under the
passive attack.
Remark 1 (Number of choices). To compare passive and
active attacks, we count the number of choices of both attacks.
While the passive attack is characterized by the matrix KE ,
the information leaked to Eve in the passive attack depends
only on the kernel of the matrix KE . To characterize the
information leaked to Eve, we consider two matrices to be
equivalent when their kernels are the same. In a passive
attack, when we fix the rank of KE (the dimension of leaked
information), by taking into account the equivalent class, the
number of possible choices is upper bounded by qm2(m3−m2).
With an active attack, this calculation is more complicated. For
simplicity, we consider the case with n = 1. To consider the
minimum number of choices of αn, we assume condition (5).
(When we do not make this assumption, the number of choices
is larger.) We do not count the choice for the inputs on the
edge η(i) with η(i) ≥ ζ(m6) because it does not affect Eve’s
information. Then, even when we fix the matrices KE , HE ,
the number of choices of αn is
q
∑
i:η(i)<ζ(m6)
qTi , (9)
where Ti := max{j|η(i) ≥ ζ(j)}. Notice that Ti = i when
EA = EE . If we count the choice on the remaining edges,
we need to multiply q
∑
i:η(i)≥ζ(m6) q
Ti
on (9). For a generic
natural number n, the number of choices of αn is
qn
∑
i:η(i)<ζ(m6)
qnTi . (10)
III. ASYMPTOTIC SETTING WITH SECRECY AND
ROBUSTNESS
In this section, under the model given in Section II, we
consider the asymptotic setting by taking account of robustness
as well as secrecy while Eve’s strategy α is assumed to
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satisfy the uniqueness condition. We previously assumed that
the matrices KB , KE , HB , and HE , i.e., the topology and
dynamics of the network and the edge attacked by Eve do
not change during n transmissions. Now, we assume that Eve
knows these matrices and that Alice and Bob know none of
them because Alice and Bob often do not know the topology
and/nor dynamics of the network and/nor the places of the
edges attacked by Eve. However, due to the limitation of Eve’s
ability, we assume that the dimension of the information leaked
to Eve and the rank of the information injected by Eve are
limited to m2 and m1, respectively. Indeed, when the original
network is given by the graph (V,E) and Eve eavesdrops at
most m′6 edges and injects the noise at most m
′
5 edges, we
have m2 ≤ m′6 and m1 ≤ m′5. This evaluation is still valid
even in the wiretap and replacement model. Therefore, it is
natural to assume the upper bounds of these dimensions. (See
Remark 2.)
When Eve adds the error Zn, there is a possibility that Bob
cannot recover the original information M . This problem is
called robustness, and may be regarded as a kind of error cor-
rection. Under the conventional error correction, the error Zn
is treated as a random variable subject to a certain distribution.
However, our problem is different from the conventional error
correction because the decoding error probability depends on
the strategy αn. Hence, we denote it by Pe[Φn,K,H, αn].
Then, the following proposition is known.
Proposition 1 ([21], [22], [23], [32]). Assume that m2+m1 <
m0. There exists a sequence of non-local codes Φn of block-
length ln on a finite field Fq whose message set is Fknq such
that
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m1 (11)
lim
n→∞maxK,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0, (12)
where the maximum is taken with respect to
(KB , HB ,KE , HE) ∈ Fm4×m3q × Fm4×m5q × Fm6×m3q ×
Fm6×m5q with conditions (3) and (4). Here, there is no
restriction for the choice of m5 and m6.
The existing proof of Proposition 1 is given as a combi-
nation of several results. Each part of the existing proof is
hard to read because it omits the detail derivation. Hence,
for readers’ convenience, we give its alternative proof in
Appendix B, which has an improvement over the existing
proof. Combining Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, we obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. We assume that m2 +m1 < m0. There exists a
sequence of non-local codes Φn of block-length ln on finite
field Fq whose message set is Fknq such that
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m1 −m2 (13)
lim
n→∞maxK,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0 (14)
max
K,H
max
αn
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0, (15)
where the maximum is taken in the same way as with Propo-
sition 1.
Before our proof, we prepare basic facts about information-
theoretic security. We focus on a random hash function fR
from X to Y with random variable R deciding the function
fR. It is called universal2 when
Pr{fR(x) = y} ≤ |Y||X | (16)
for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
For s ∈ (0, 1], we define the conditional Re´nyi entropy
H1+s(X|Z) for the joint distribution PXZ as [11]
H1+s(X|Z) := −1
s
log
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
∑
x∈X
PX|Z(x|z)1+s, (17)
which is often denoted by H↑1+s(X|Z) in [36], [37]. When X
obeys the uniform distribution, we have
H1+s(X|Z) ≥ log |X ||Z| . (18)
Proposition 2. [9], [10][11, Theorem 1]
I(fR(X);Z|R) ≤ e
s log |Y|−H1+s(X|Z)
s
(19)
for s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof of Theorem 2: We choose a sequence of non-
local codes {Φn = (φn, ψn)} given in Corollary 1. We fix
k¯n := kn − m2ln − d
√
lne. Now, we choose a universal2
linear surjective random hash function fR from Fknq to Fk¯nq .
To construct our non-local code, we consider a virtual
protocol as follows. First, Alice sends a larger message M
by using the non-local code Φn, and Bob recovers it. Second,
Alice randomly chooses R deciding the hash function fR and
sends it to Bob via a public channel. Finally, Alice and Bob
apply the hash function fR to their message, and denote the
result value by M¯ so that Alice and Bob share the information
M¯ with a probability of close to 1.
Since the conditional mutual information between
M¯ and Y lnE depends on Φn,K,H, α
n, we denote
it by I(M¯ ;Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H, αn]. Theorem 1 shows
I(M¯ ;Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H, αn] = I(M¯ ;Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H, 0],
which does not depend on KB , HB , HE and depends only on
KE . Now, we evaluate this leaked information via a similar
idea to that reported in [12]. Since inequality (18) implies
that H1+s(M |Y lnE ) ≥ (kn − lnm2) log q, Proposition 2 yields
I(M¯ ;Y lnE |R)[Φn,K,H, 0] ≤
es(k¯n log q−H1+s(M |Y
ln
E ))
s
≤q
s(k¯n−kn+lnm2)
s
≤ q
−sd√lne
s
.
(20)
We set s = 1. For each matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q satisfying
rankKE = m2, Markov inequality guarantees that the in-
equality
I(M¯ ;Y lnE )[Φn,K,H, 0]|R=r ≤ q−d
√
lne+c+1 (21)
holds at least with probability 1 − q−c−1. Since the num-
ber of matrices KE satisfying rankKE = m2 is upper
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bounded by qm6m3 , there exists a matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q such
that rankKE = m2 and (21) does not hold at most with
probability qm6m3q−c−1. Hence, (21) holds for any matrix
KE ∈ Fm6×m3q satisfying rankKE = m2 at least with
probability 1− qm6m3q−c−1. Letting c be m6m3, we have
I(M¯ ;Y lnE )[Φn,K,H, 0]|R=r ≤ q−d
√
lne+m6m3+1 (22)
for any matrix KE ∈ Fm6×m3q satisfying rankKE = m2 at
least with probability 1− 1q . Therefore, there exists a suitable
hash function fr such that
I(M¯ ;Y lnE )[Φn,K,H, 0]|R=r ≤ q−d
√
lne+m6m3+1,
which goes to zero as n goes to infinity because m6m3 + 1
is a constant. Since the code on our network is linear, Eve
observes a subspace of input information Fk¯nq . Hence, the
amount of leaked information is an integer times log q. Hence,
as discussed in [13], when ln is sufficiently large, there exists
a suitable hash function fr such that
I(M¯ ;Y lnE )[Φn,K,H, 0]|R=r = 0.
Now, we return to the construction of non-local codes. We
choose the sets M and L as Fk¯nq and Fm2ln+d
√
lne
q , respec-
tively. Since the linearity and the surjectivity of fr implies
that |f−1r (x)| = qm2ln+d
√
lne for any element x ∈M, we can
define the invertible function f¯r from M×L to the domain
of fr, i.e., Fknq such that f¯−1r (f−1r (x)) = {x} × L for any
element x ∈M. This condition implies that fr ◦ f¯r(x, y) = x
for (x, y) ∈M×L. Then, we define our non-local encoder as
φ¯n := φn◦f¯r, and our non-local decoder as ψ¯n := fr◦ψn. The
sequence of non-local codes {(φ¯n, ψ¯n)} satisfies the desired
requirements.
Remark 2. If we replace the condition (4) by the condition
rankHB ≤ m1, rankKE ≤ m2, (23)
the Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 still hold due to the
following reason. For (KB , HB ,KE , HE) to satisfy (3)
and (23), there exists (K ′B , H
′
B ,K
′
E , H
′
E) to satisfy (3)
and (4) such that Pe[Φn,K,H, αn] ≤ Pe[Φn,K ′,H ′, αn]
and I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α
n] ≤ I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K ′,H ′, αn].
Hence, the Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 still hold under this
modification.
Remark 3 (Efficient non-local code construction). We discuss
an efficient construction of our non-local code from a non-
local code (φn, ψn) given in Corollary 1 with q = 2. A
modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be
a universal2 linear surjective hash function, which is given
by a concatenation (T (S), I) of the (m2ln + d
√
lne) × k¯n
Toeplitz matrix T (S) and the k¯n × k¯n identity matrix I [38],
where S is the random seed used to decide the Toeplitz matrix
and belongs to Fkn−12 . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are
particularly useful in practice, because there exists an effi-
cient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform
algorithm with complexity O(ln log ln).
When the random seed S is fixed, the encoder for
our non-local code is given as follows. By using the
scramble random variable L ∈ Fm2ln+d
√
lne)
2 , the en-
coder φ¯n is given as φn
((
I −T (S)
0 I
)(
M
L
))
because
(I, T (S))
( I −T (S)
0 I
)
= (I, 0). (The multiplication of
Toeplitz matrix T (S) can be performed as a part of a
circulant matrix. For example, the reference [38, Appendix C]
provides a method to give a circulant matrix.). A more efficient
construction for univeral2 hash function is discussed in [38].
Hence, the decoder ψ¯n is given as Y lnB 7→ (I, T (S))ψn(Y lnB ).
Remark 4. Here, we clarify the difference between our results
and the setting of the preceding papers [14], [15], [16], [32],
[34], [40], which consider correctness and secrecy. Their se-
crecy analysis is different from our analysis although the non-
local code construction in [14], [15], [16], [32], [34] does not
depend on the concrete form of matrices KB ,KE , HB , HE ,
which is similar to our non-local code construction.
While the papers [39], [32] considered correctness when
the error exists, it discusses the secrecy only when there is
no error. Similarly, the paper [40] considers a different active
adversary model, in which, it discusses the node-repair and
data-reconstruction operations even in the presence of such
an attack while the model of passive eavesdroppers in the
paper [40] discusses the secrecy with respect to the message
to be transmitted. Indeed, the papers [39], [32] provided
a statement similar to Theorem 2. However, it showed only
Eq. (14) and limn→∞maxK,H I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, 0] = 0
instead of (15) by combining Proposition 4 and the result of
the paper [39]. To show (15), we need to employ Theorem
1. If we do not apply Theorem 1 in step (22) in our proof
of Theorem 2, we have to multiply the number of choices of
strategy αn. As a generalization of (9), this number is given in
(10), which grows up double-exponentially. Hence, our proof
of Theorem 2 does not work without the use of Theorem 1.
While the papers [16, Proposition 5][34] consider the
secrecy when the error exists, it addresses the amount of
leaked information only when the eavesdropper does not
know the information of the noise. That is, they evaluate the
mutual information between M and Y nE . However, our analysis
evaluates the leaked information when the eavesdropper knows
the information about the noise. That is, we address the mutual
information between M and the pair (Y nE , Z
n).
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SETTING WITH SECRECY
When Alice and Bob can communicate via public channel,
the verification of correctness can be done by a universal2 hash
function [35, Section VIII][41, Step 4 of Protocol 2]. When
we employ a modified Toeplitz matrix as a universal2 hash
function and m2 bits are exchanged for the verification, it has
only calculation complexity O(m2 logm2). Due to this step,
we can guarantee the correctness with probability 1 − 2−m2 ,
which is called the significance level[35, Section VIII]. Hence,
in this case, we consider the case when only the secrecy is
imposed and the robustness is not imposed. That is, we impose
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the following condition.
lim
n→∞maxK
Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = lim
n→∞maxK,H
Pe[Φn,K,H, 0] = 0.
(24)
However, even when the verification of correctness is passed,
there is a possibility that Eve can make an active attack to
satisfy
Pe[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0. (25)
Hence, as the secrecy, we impose the following condition.
max
K,H
max
αn
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0. (26)
Here, both maximums are taken with respect to (KE , HE) ∈
Fm6×m3q × Fm6×m5q with (3) and (4). We notice that the
situation of the correctness (24) is different from the situation
of the secrecy (26). Indeed, it is possible to restrict the range
of αn by imposing the condition (25). However, since it
is not so easy to handle the condition (25), the maximum
for αn is addressed without the restriction (25). That is, the
correctness (24) addresses only the case with passive attack,
but the secrecy (26) addresses the cases with active attack.
This setting appears when we consider quantum key distri-
bution, as explained in Section V. Then, we have the following
theorem to analyze this problem.
Theorem 3. There exists a sequence of non-local codes Φn
of block-length ln on finite field Fq whose message set is Fknq
such that conditions (24) and (26) and
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m2 (27)
holds.
From the definition, we see that Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] =
Pe[Φn,K,H, 0]. Also, note that Pe[Φn,K, 0, αn] does not
depend on KE . Further, the rate m0 −m2 is asymptotically
optimal, i.e., there is no non-local code surpassing the rate
m0 − m2, which follows from the converse part of the
conventional wire-tap channel [42], [43].
To show the above theorem, as a special case of Theorem
2 with m1 = 0, we prepare the following corollary.
Corollary 1. There exists a sequence of non-local codes Φn
of block-length ln on finite field Fq whose message set is Fknq
such that
lim
n→∞
kn
ln
= m0 −m2 (28)
max
K
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (29)
lim
n→∞maxK
Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (30)
where the maximum is taken with respect to (KB ,KE) ∈
Fm4×m3q × Fm6×m3q under the conditions (3) and (4).
Combining Corollary 1 and Theorem 1, we obtain Theorem
3.
Here, we compare existing results with Corollary 1. As
a similar result to Corollary 1, the following proposition is
known. Since Corollary 1 does not require the assumptions
m3 = m4 = m0 and KB = I , Corollary 1 is slightly
advantageous. Hence, Theorem 3 is a stronger statement than
the following existing statement.
Proposition 3 ([13, Theorem 7],[16]). We assume that m3 =
m4 = m0 and KB = I . There exists a sequence of non-local
codes Φn of block-length n on finite field Fq whose message
set is Fknq such that
lim
n→∞
kn
n
= m0 −m2 (31)
lim
n→∞maxK
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (32)
lim
n→∞Pe[Φn,K, 0, 0] = 0, (33)
where the maximum is taken with respect to KE ∈ Fm6×m3q
with condition (4).
V. APPLICATION TO NETWORK QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
In this section, to realize long-distance communication with
quantum key distribution, using the result in Sections III
and IV, we consider a network of quantum key distribution.
Although the existing studies [7], [8] discussed a similar case
over routing networks, they did not discuss the relation with
network code including active attacks.
Assume that the authorized sender, Alice, is connected to the
authorized receiver, Bob, via the network given by the graph
(V,E) with |E| = k. A linear operation is fixed in each node
so that we have the relation YB = KBX with Alice’s input X
and Bob’s output YB . Then, if secure information transmission
is available on each edge, secure communication from Alice
to Bob can be realized. For every edge (u, v) ∈ E, the distant
nodes u and v generate secure common keys by quantum key
distribution. That is, k pairs of secure keys are generated by
quantum key distribution. In the following, we discuss how we
can make secure message transmission from Alice to Bob by
using these k pairs of secure keys with public channels. This
kind of secure communication is called network quantum key
distribution.
First, we consider the case when all nodes are authenticated.
In this case, Alice can securely send her message X to Bob
in the following way. Let Xi be the random variable to
be transmitted on the i-th edge. Let Zi be the secure keys
generated in the i-th edge by quantum key distribution. When
Xi is directly transmitted, this information transmission is not
secure. To realize security, Yi := Xi+Zi is transmitted on the
i-th edge, instead. Then, a secure transmission in each edge is
realized. Hence, due to the above relation YB = KBX , secure
communication from Alice to Bob can be realized.
However, it is very difficult to guarantee security when
a part of the nodes are occupied by Eve. Such a model
is often called a node adversary model while the model
introduced in Section II is called an edge adversary model.
The main problem with network quantum key distribution is
the realization of secure communication from Alice to Bob
under a node adversary model. To investigate the security in
the node adversary model, we convert a given node adversary
model to a special case of the edge adversary model as in [31].
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In an edge adversary model, Eve wiretaps and contaminates
the information only on the edges EE . To apply the model
to the current situation, we consider that all the edges linked
to the nodes occupied by Eve are wiretapped and controlled
by Eve. When these occupied nodes communicate with each
other, Eve’s attack is an active attack. That is, analysis for
active attack is essential. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2
to the security analysis of the direct transmission of the secret
message via network quantum key distribution. In quantum
key distribution, it is usual to assume that Alice and Bob share
secure random numbers whose lengths are asymptotically neg-
ligible in block-length n because the asymptotically negligible
keys are needed for authentication for the public channel. In
this case, to generate secure keys with length O(n), we can
employ Theorem 3, where the asymptotically negligible keys
are used for an error verification test.
v(1)
Alice Bob
v(2)
v(3)
v(4) v(8)
v(5)
v(6)
v(7)
e(2)
e(3)
e(4)
e(1)
e(5)
e(6)
e(7)
e(8)
e(9)
e(10)
e(11)
e(13)
e(12)
e(14)
Fig. 1. Network with name of edges
v(1)
Alice Bob
1X
2X
3X
4X
1X
1X
2X
3X
3X
4X
1X
3X
1 2X X+
3 4X X+
v(2)
v(3)
v(4) v(8)
v(5)
v(6)
v(7)
Fig. 2. Network with network flow
For example, we consider the network given in Fig. 1,
which has nodes v(1), . . . , v(8) as intermediates nodes. Fig. 2
expresses the information flow on each edge in this network.
This network connects Alice and Bob with rank 4. The ranks
of KE and HB of typical cases are summarized in Table II.
Also, Section II-D of [33] discusses the same network.
TABLE II
RANKS OF KE AND HB DEPENDENTLY OF ATTACKED NODES
Nodes to be attacked rank KE rank HB
v(1) 1 2
v(2) 1 1
v(6) 2 1
v(2)&v(5) 2 2
v(2)&v(6) 2 1
v(1)&v(3) 2 4
v(1)&v(2) 2 3
v(1)&v(6) 2 2
v(1)&v(8) 3 3
v(6)&v(8) 4 2
When the number of nodes occupied by Eve is limited to 1,
the ranks of KE and HB are upper bounded by 2. In the latter
case, Theorem 3 guarantees that Alice can securely transmit
a random number with rank 2 per single use of the network.
In the former case, since 4 − 2 − 2 = 0, Theorem 2 cannot
guarantee that Alice securely transmits her message to Bob.
As another example, we consider the circle type network
given in Fig. 3, in which, the nodes connect the next nodes
and the nodes after the next. Assume that we have pairs of
secret keys in the circle type network of Fig. 3. We suppose
that v(1) intends to communicate with v(8) securely. They
make the network as v(1)→ v(12)→ v(10)→ v(8), v(1)→
v(11)→ v(9)→ v(8), v(1)→ v(3)→ v(5)→ v(7)→ v(8),
v(1) → v(2) → v(4) → v(6) → v(8), which connects v(1)
and v(8) with rank 4. When Eve occupies one intermediate
node, the ranks of KE and HB are one. In the latter case,
Theorem 3 guarantees that Alice in v(1) can securely transmit
a random number with rank 3 per single use of the network.
In the former case, Theorem 2 guarantees that Alice in v(1)
securely transmits her message to Bob with rank 2 per single
use of the network.
v(1)
v(12)
v(11)
v(10)
v(9)
v(8) v(7)
v(6)
v(5)
v(4)
v(3)
v(2)
Fig. 3. Circle type network
When Eve occupies two intermediate nodes, the ranks of
KE and HB are at most two. In the latter case, Theorem 3
guarantees that Alice in v(1) can securely transmit a random
number with rank 2 per single use of the network. In the
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former case, Theorem 2 cannot guarantee that Alice in v(1)
securely transmits her message to Bob. This method can be
generalized to the case when Alice and Bob are v(i) and v(j)
with |i− j| ≥ 2(mod 12).
Indeed, this idea can be generalized to this circle type
network even when the number of nodes is odd. Further,
this network can be generalized to the following network of
quantum key distribution with two integers k > l > 0. The set
of nodes is given as {v(i)}ki=1, and the set of edges is given
as {(v(i), v(j))}|i−j|≤l( mod k). Now, we set Alice and Bob
as v(i) and v(j) with |i − j| ≥ l(mod k). Then, they can
make 2l paths connecting v(i) and v(j) without duplication
in the intermediate nodes. Then, even when 2l − 1 nodes are
occupied by Eve, Alice and Bob can securely share a secret
random number due to Theorem 3.
VI. APPLICATION TO MULTIPLE MULTICAST NETWORK
Before considering the multiple multicast network, we con-
sider the multicast case, in which a single user broadcasts
his/her message to several receivers. This setting can be
applied to the multiple multicast network that can be realized
by a combination of point-to-point quantum key distribution.
Remember the encoding and the decoding depend only on
the integers m0,m1,m2,m3,m4 in Theorem 2. Assume that
we have b receivers (receiver1, . . ., receiver b). The integers
m2 and m3 do not depend on receiver i. Since m0,m1 and
m4 depend on receiver i, they are written as m0(i),m1(i)
and m4(i). Since each receiver can add an extra dimension,
we can consider that the dimension of observed information
by each receiver is m˜4 := maxim4(i). Then, we choose
m˜0 := minim0(i) and m˜1 := maxim1(i). We apply
Theorem 2 to the case with m0 = m˜0, m1 = m˜1, m2,m3, and
m4 = m˜4. When the encoder of the obtained non-local code
is used in the sender and the decoder of the obtained non-local
code is used in all the receivers, the rate m˜0 − m˜1 −m2.
Now, we proceed to the multiple multicast case, which
contains multiple unicast case. We consider how to apply
our result to a multiple multicast network with a senders and∑a
i=1 bi receivers, in which, the senders and the receivers are
labeled as i and (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ a and 1 ≤ j ≤ bi,
respectively. Sender i intends to securely send the message
to Receiver (i, j). That is, Sender i wants to keep secrecy
for Receiver (i′, j) with i′ 6= i. In the one-time use of the
network, Sender i sends m3,i symbols ~Xi of Fq via m3,i
channels and Receiver (i, j) receives m4,i,j symbols ~Yi,jof Fq
via m4,i,j channels. Without loss of generality, adding extra
dimensions, we can assume that m4,i,j does not depend on j
and is simplified to m4,i due to the following reason. That is,
when m4,i,j < maxj′ m4,i,j′ , we can consider that Receiver
(i, j) receives symbol 0 via maxj′ m4,i,j′ −m4,i,j channels.
If the codes in the network are designed perfectly, we have no
cross-line nor no information leakage to unintended receivers.
In this section, we consider the case with a small amount of
cross line and information leakage to unintended receivers due
to errors on the design of the network.
We assume that these senders and receivers are connected
via network composed of linear operations. Then, using ma-
trices Ki,j;i′ , we can describe their relations as
~Yi,j =
a∑
i′=1
Ki,j;i′ ~Xi′ . (34)
While the senders transmit their information repeatedly, we as-
sume that the coefficient matrices Ki,j;i′ do not change. We as-
sume that receivers do not collude to recover the message from
senders. Now, we apply the model (6) and (7) to the secure
communication transmission from Sender i to Receiver (i, j).
When we consider information leakage to Receiver (i′′, j′′)
with i′′ 6= i, we substitute ~Xi, ( ~Xi′)i′ 6=i, ~Yi,j and ~Yi′′,j′′ into
X , Z, YB , and YE , respectively. We assume that the rank
of information crossed from other senders is m1,i,j and the
rank of leaked information to Receiver (i′′, j′′) is m2,i;i′′,j′′ .
We introduce the maximum ranks m0,i := maxj rankKi,j;i,
m1,i := maxjm1,i,j , and m2,i := maxi′′,j′′ m2,i;i′′,j′′ . Sender
i and Receiver (i, j) are assumed to know only the integers
m0,i, m1,i, m2,i, m3,i, m4,i and have no other knowledge
for the network structure. We choose our non-local code by
applying Theorem 4 to the case with m0 = m0,i, m1 = m1,i,
m2 = m2,i, m3 = m3,i, and m4 = m4,i. Since the non-
local code does not depend on the choice of j and i′′, j′′, this
non-local code works well in this situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed how sequential error injection affects
the information leaked to Eve. As the result, we have shown
that there is no improvement when the network is composed
of linear operations. However, when the network contains
non-linear operations, we have found a counterexample that
improves the information obtained by Eve. Moreover, as
Theorem 2, we have shown the achievability of the asymptotic
rate m0−m1−m2 for a linear network under the secrecy and
robustness conditions when the transmission rate from Alice
to Bob is m0, the rate of noise injected by Eve is m1, and
the rate of information leakage to Eve is m2. The converse
part of this rate is an interesting open problem. In addition, as
Theorem 3, we have discussed the secrecy and the asymptotic
transmission rate when Eve has a possibility to inject noise
into the network.
Further, we have applied our results to network quantum key
distribution. Then, we have clarified what type of network will
enable us to realize secure long-distance communication based
on short-distance quantum key distribution. However, when
we consider only the case given in Fig. 3, we can employ a
classical (non-quantum) secret sharing protocol [44] instead of
network coding because all of the communications of this case
are routing. In particular, cheater-identifiable secret sharing
against rushing cheaters [45], [46], [47], [48], [49] enables us
to share secure keys without using public channels or prior
shared randomness.
In this way, this paper has discussed the application of
secure network coding to a network model whose communi-
cations on the edges are realized by quantum key distribution.
Replacing the role of quantum key distribution by physical
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layer security, we can consider a secure network based on
physical layer security. In particular, we can use secure wire-
less communication [41], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55],
[56], [57], [58] as a typical form of physical layer security,
which provides us with a secure network based on secure
wireless communication. A crucial weak point of physical
layer security is the possibility that the eavesdropper might
break the assumption of the model. Such an attack might be
realized in the following cases. (1) The eavesdropper concen-
trates his/her resources on one point. (2) The eavesdropper
luckily encounters a situation that the assumption is broken.
When we combine physical layer security and secure network
coding in the above way, to eavesdrop our information, the
eavesdropper needs to break the model of physical layer
security in multiple communication channels. In case (1), to
realize this condition, the eavesdropper has to distribute his/her
resources, which increases the difficulty of eavesdropping.
For case (2), the eavesdropper must be lucky in multiple
communication channels, and this probability is very small.
In this way, this kind of combination is particularly useful.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We define two random variables Y nE,p := KEX
n and
Y nE,a := KEX
n+HEZ
n. Eve can simulate her outcome Y nE,a
under the strategy α from Y nE,p, HE , and Z
n. So, we have
I(M ;Y nE,p) ≥ I(M ;Y nE,a, Zn) = I(M ;Y nE,a). Conversely,
since Y nE,p is given as a function of Y
n
E,a, Z
n, and HE , we
have the opposite inequality.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To show Proposition 1, we regard any element of the finite
field Fq as an element of a t-dimensional algebraic extension
Fq′ of the finite field Fq , where q′ = qt. The matrices
KB , HB ,KE , HE on Fq can be regarded as matrices on Fq′ .
By choosing ln := tn, the matrices X ln , Y lnB , Y
ln
E , Z
ln
on Fq are converted to matrices X ′n, Y ′B
n, Y ′E
n, Z ′n on
Fq′ , which also satisfy (6) and (7) by regarding the same
matrices KB , HB ,KE , HE on Fq as matrices on Fq′ . Then,
the following proposition is known.
Proposition 4 ([23], [21], [22], [32]). We assume the following
two conditions for m2,m1,m0 and a sequence of prime power
q′n. The inequality m2 + m1 < m0 holds. The size q
′
n of the
finite field increases such that q
′
n
nm0+1
→∞. Then, there exists
a sequence of non-local codes Φn of block-length n on finite
field Fq′n whose message set is F
k′n
q′n
such that
lim
n→∞
k′n
n
= m0 −m1 (35)
lim
n→∞maxK,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0, (36)
where the maximum is taken in the same way as with Propo-
sition 1.
The optimality of the rate m0 − m1 was also shown
under the condition (36) in [32, Sections VI & VII]. By
choosing tn = d (m0+1) lognlog q e and ln := tnn, Proposition 4
implies Proposition 1. Hence, we need to explain how to show
Proposition 4.
Combining the results in [23], [21], [22], [32], we can
construct a sequence of non-local codes to satisfy (35) and
(36). More precisely, the papers [21, Section IX][22, Section
VIII] constructed a sequence of non-local codes to satisfy (35)
and (36) under the condition m2 +2m1 < m0. This is because
the condition m2 + 2m1 < m0 is stronger than the condition
m2 + m1 < m0, which is the assumption of Proposition 4.
To show (36) under the weaker condition m2 + m1 < m0,
the papers by Jaggi, Langberg, Katti, Ho, Katabi, Me´dard,
and Effros [21, Section VII][22, Section VI][32, Section IV-
C] constructed a sequence of non-local codes to satisfy (35)
and (36), when Alice can send Bob secret information whose
size is asymptotically negligible in comparison with n, in the
following way.
Proposition 5 ([23], [21], [22]). We assume the following
three conditions. The inequality m0 > m1 holds. Alice can
send Bob secret information whose size is asymptotically
negligible in comparison with n. The size q′n of the finite
field increases such that q
′
n
nm0+1
→ ∞. Then, there exists a
sequence of non-local codes Φn of block-length n on finite
field Fq′n whose message set is F
k′n
q′n
such that the relations
(36) and (35) hold.
Then, under the weaker condition m2 + m1 < m0, as
the following proposition, the papers [23, Section III][32,
Section V] provide a protocol for secure transmission of
random variables with an asymptotically negligible length kn
in comparison with n, which is the requirement in Proposition
5.
Proposition 6 ([23, Section III],[32, Section V]). We assume
the inequality m2 +m1 < m0. Then, there exists a sequence
of non-local codes Φn of block-length n whose message set is
Fknq such that
lim
n→∞ kn =∞ (37)
lim
n→∞maxK,H
max
αn
Pe[Φn,K,H, α
n] = 0, (38)
lim
n→∞maxK,H
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, 0] = 0, (39)
where the maximum is taken in the same way as Proposition
4.
Therefore, attaching the protocol of Proposition 6 to the
non-local codes given in Proposition 5, we obtain (36) under
the weaker condition m2 +m1 < m0. However, their proof of
Proposition 5 is very hard to read because it omits the detail
derivation. In the following, we give an alternative proof of
Proposition 5.
Before our proof of Proposition 5, we prepare two lemmas.
The first lemma can be easily shown by the discussion of
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linear algebra. In the following discussion, we simplify q′n to
q′.
Lemma 1. For integers a0 ≤ a1 + a2, a′1, a′2, we fix an
a1-dimensional subspace W1 ⊂ Fa
′
1
q′ and an a2-dimensional
subspace W2 ⊂ Fa
′
2
q′ . We assume the following two conditions.
(E1) An a0 × a′1 matrix A1 and an a0 × a′2 matrix A2
satisfy
KerA1|W1 = {0}, (40)
ImA1 ∩ ImA2 = {0}, (41)
where Im(f) denotes the image of the function f .
(E2) We consider a subspace W3 ⊂W1⊕W2. For vectors
x1, . . . , xb ∈ W1 and y1, . . . , yb ∈ W2 with b ≥
a1 + a2, (x1, y1), . . . , (xb, yb) span W3.
Then, we have the following statements.
(E3) There exists an a′1 × a0 matrix A3 such that
A3(A1xi +A2yi) = xi for i = 1, . . . , b, i.e.,
A3 [A1 A2]
[
x1 x2 · · · xb
y1 y2 · · · yb
]
=
[
x1 x2 · · · xb
]
. (42)
(E4) The above matrix A3 satisfies the relation
A3(A1x+A2y) = x (43)
for any (x, y) ∈W3.
Proof: Due to condition (E1), we choose a map A4 from
ImA1 to W1 such that A4A1 is the identify on W1. Since W1
is included in Fa
′
1
q′ , A4 can be regarded as a map from ImA1
to Fa
′
1
q′ . Then, we choose a projection A5 from F
a0
q′ to ImA1
such that A5x = 0 for x ∈ ImA2. Therefore, A3 := A5A4
satisfies the condition of (E3). Further, (E2) guarantees (E4).
Lemma 2 ([21, Section VII][22, Claim 5]). We independently
choose m random variables V1, . . . , Vm subject to the uniform
distribution on Fq′ . We define the n×m matrix U1 as U1;i,j :=
(Vj)
i with i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m. Then,
Pr{xU1 = x′U1} ≤
( n
q′
)m
(44)
for any x 6= x′ ∈ Fnq′ .
Proof of Proposition 5:
Step (1): Non-local code construction
First, we provide our non-local code when we use the channel
n times based on the finite field Fq′ . Our message is given as
an (m0 −m1) × n matrix M , which satisfies condition (35)
asymptotically. Since the rank of HB is m1, there exist an
m4 ×m1 matrix HˆB and an m1 × n matrix Zˆn such that
Y nB = KBU0X
n +HBZ
n = KBU0X
n + HˆBZˆ
n. (45)
Then, we address HˆB and Zˆn instead of HB and Zn.
We fix an integer m := m0 + 1. We independently choose
m random variables V1, . . . , Vm subject to the uniform distri-
bution on Fq′ . Also, we randomly choose the m3×m3 matrix
U0 among all m3 ×m3 invertible matrices.
Then, we define the n × m matrix U1 as U1;i,j := (Vj)i
with i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m. We also define the (m0−
m1)×m matrix U2 := MU1. Moreover, we define the m3×n
matrix Xn :=
[
M
0
]
, where 0 is the m1×n zero matrix. As
secret information with a negligible rate, Alice sends Bob the
information V1, . . . , Vm, U2. Then, Alice inputs the m3 × n
matrix U0Xn as the input of n times use of the channel.
Then, Bob receives the m4 × n matrix Y nB given in (45)
as well as the secret information V1, . . . , Vm, U2. Since the
ranks of KBU0Xn and HˆB are m0 − m1 and m1 at most,
respectively, the rank of the matrix Y nB is m0 at most. We
denote the rank by m¯0. We choose m¯0 linearly independent
row vectors from the row vectors of Y nB . We denote the m¯0×
n matrix composed of the m¯0 independent row vectors by
Y¯ nB . Similarly, we denote the matrices composed of these m¯0
row vectors of the matrices KB and HˆB by K¯B and H¯B ,
respectively. Then, using the standard Gaussian elimination,
Bob finds a matrix U3 to satisfy the equation
U3Y¯
n
BU1 = U2, (46)
which is equivalent to
U3
[
K¯BU0Pm0−m1 H¯B
] [ M
Zˆn
]
U1 = MU1, (47)
where Pm0−m1 is the imbedding
[
I
0
]
from Fm0−m1q′ to
Fm3q′ . Notice that Bob can calculate U1 from the secret in-
formation V1, . . . , Vm. Finally, Bob recovers the information
Mˆ := U3Y¯
n
B . To check the condition (46), Bob needs only
Y¯ nB , U2, and U1, which can be computed from V1, . . . , Vm.
Step (2): Analysis of performance
There are two conditions if the above protocol is to work well.
(F1) The relations Im(K¯BU0Pm0−m1) ∩ Im H¯B = {0}
and Ker K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} hold.
(F2) The relation rank
[
M
Zˆn
]
U1 = rank
[
M
Zˆn
]
holds,
where rank denotes the rank of the matrix.
Assume that conditions (F1) and (F2) hold. We ap-
ply Lemma 1 to the case when a0 = m¯0, a1 =
rankM,a2 = rank Zˆ
n,W1 = ImM,W2 = Im Zˆ
n, A1 =
K¯BU0Pm0−m1 , A2 = H¯B , A3 = U3. Then, conditions (F1)
and (F2) guarantee conditions (E1) and (E2), respectively.
Then, due to condition (E3), there exists a matrix U3 that
satisfies equation (46), i.e., (47). Condition (E4) guarantees
that U3Y¯ nB = M , i.e., Bob can decode the message M .
Now, we evaluate the probability that condition (F2) holds.
Condition (F2) holds if and only if zT
[
M
Zˆn
]
U1 6= 0 for any
z ∈ Fm0q′ satisfying the condition zT
[
M
Zˆn
]
6= 0. Applying
Lemma 2 to all of z(6= 0) ∈ Fm0q′ , we find that condition (F2)
holds at least with probability 1−q′m0( nq′ )m = 1− n
m
q′m−m0 =
1− nm0+1q′ → 1.
Finally, we evaluate the probability that condition (F1)
holds. As shown later, the following conditions (F1’) and (F1”)
imply condition (F1).
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(F1’) The relation Im(KBU0Pm0−m1) ∩ Im HˆB = {0}
holds.
(F1”) The relation KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} holds.
Hence, we show that conditions (F1’) and (F1”) hold with
a probability close to 1. Condition Im(KBU0Pm0−m1) ∩
Im HˆB = {0} holds if and only if ImU0Pm0−m1 ∩
K−1B (Im HˆB) = {0}. For a fixed KB , HˆB , since
dimK−1B (Im HˆB) ≤ m3 − m0 + m1, the probability of
condition Im(KBU0Pm0−m1) ∩ Im HˆB = {0} is at least
(1− q′m3−m0+m1−m3)(1− q′m3−m0+m1−m3+1) · · ·
· (1− q′m3−m0+m1−m3+m0−m1−1)
=(1− q′m1−m0)(1− q′m1−m0+1) · · · (1− q′−1)
=1−O(1/q′). (48)
The relation KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} holds if and
only if no basis of ImU0Pm0−m1M belongs to the space
KerKB . Since KerKB is an m3−m0-dimensional subspace
of an m3-dimensional space, the probability of condition
KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} is
(1− q′−m0)(1− q′−m0+1) · · · (1− q′−m0+m7−1)
=1−O(q′−m0+m7−1), (49)
where m7 := dim ImPm0−m1M(=
dim ImU0Pm0−m1M) = dim ImM = rankM ≤ m0 −m1.
Therefore, since q′ is sufficiently large, we obtain the desired
statement.
Finally, we show that condition (F1’) implies condition
(F1). Since the relation Im(K¯BU0Pm0−m1) ∩ Im H¯B = {0}
can be shown easily from (F1’), we show only the relation
Ker K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0} from (F1’) and (F1”). The
choice of m¯0 guarantees that there exists an invertible map
U4 from Im[KBU HˆB ] to Fm¯0q′ such that U4[KBU HˆB ] =
[K¯BU H¯B ]. Thus,
Ker K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = KerU−14 K¯BU0Pm0−m1 |ImM
= KerKBU0Pm0−m1 |ImM = {0}. (50)
Remark 5. Our proof is different from the proof presented
in [21, Section VII][22, Section VI][32, Section IV-C]. They
suggested that (m0−m1)m0 +1 be chosen as m because they
employ the concept of list decoding. However, our discussion
allows us to choose a much smaller value m0 + 1 as m. This
fact shows that our evaluation is better than their evaluation in
this sense. Note that our evaluation does not use list decoding.
Proposition 4 requires a finite field Fq′ with an infinitely
large q′. The paper [38, Appendix D] discussed the construc-
tion of F2t whose multiplication and inverse multiplication
have calculation complexity O(t log t)2.
2The multiplication of elements v and z of F2t is essentially given in (124)
of [38] by using Fourier transform via a calculation on circulant matrices. For
the inverse multiplication of an element v of F2t , we calculate F−1[−Fv. ∗
Fz] instead of F−1[Fv.∗Fz] in (124), where F is discrete Fourier transform.
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